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Abstract
This  pape!  examines  a simple  dynamic  model  in  which  agents  vote  over  capital  income  taxatioD  aad
redistributive  traDsfers.  We show that  in  equilibrirult  the  typical  agent's  prelerences  over  the  tax  late  are
singlepeaked  and  derive  a closed-form  solution  for  the  majority-rule  tax  rate.  \ffe  also  show  that  high
levels  of  initial  wealih  inequality  can  place  ihe  economy  on  the  "wrong  side  of the  Laffer  curve'.
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This  note  presents  a simple  dynamic  model  of voting  orer  redistributive  taxes  and  transfers.  An  iateresting
feature  of  the  model  is  the  closed form  solution  which  we  obtain  for  a  typical  individual's  most-preferred
tax  rate.  We show that  induced  preferences.over  the  tax  rate  a.re singl+.peaked.  We apply  the  median  voter
theorem  to  characterize  the  political  equilibrium  tax  rate  and  transfer-  We also show that  for  high  levels of
nealth  inequality,  measured  as the  deviation  of the  median  from  the  mean of the  initial  wealth  distribution,
the  median  voter  may  choose a tax  rate  which  is on ihe  "wrong  side of  the  Laffer  curve".
This  a.rticie is a contribution  to the growing  literature  which  seeks to characterize  the relationship  between
the  distribution  of wealth  and the  endogenous determination  of policy  para.meters, such as tax  rates,  within
the  context  of dynamic  economies.  Krusell,  Quadrini  and  Rios-Rull  (1994)  show how  the initiat  distributiou
of wealth  would  influeace  the  resulting  long-rua  distribution,  as well  as other  wa.riables such as tax  rates  and
consumption  lerels,  within  the  contqr:t  of  a model  in  which  the  median  voter  is assumed to  determine  the
equilibrium  tax  rate-  Huftnan  (1996)  also shows how  the  labor  and  capital  tax  rates'lvould  fluctuate  when
a uajority  voting  scheme determines  these parameters-
2. The rnodel
Individuals  i!  the  economy  live  for  two  periods-  The  economic  decisious  which  a typical  individual  makes
are sequenced as follorvs.  Each  individual  begins  with  some initial  wealth  y  €  y  CII+.  In  period  one, an
individua.l  divides  his  or  her  idtial  wea.lih inio  consumption  aod  savings.  Savings  earn  au 8.fter-tax  returtr
of  (1 -  d) &  where  ,8 is  constant  and  d is  the  tax  ret€.  In  period  two,  the  ildividual  consumes after-tax
income  from  savings  plus  a per  capita  lumpsum  trsrsfer  r.  The  ta.x rate  a.nd traJxsfer are identical  across
agents,  and  the  trarsfer  is fuunced  with  revenue collected  ftom  the  tax  on saviags income.  Individuals  have
identical  preferences  oler  consumption  in  the  tr"o  periods,  aod  these  preferences  are  assr.med to  iake  the- logarithmic, time-additive  forrl
u(c1,c2):  log  (c1)  + Blog  (c2).
Prior  to  the period-one consumptioo-savings  decision, individuals  vote over tax-and-transfer schemes.
The imposition  of a balanced govern-ment  budgett together with  second-period  general equilibrium,  means
the issue space  can be reduced to the on+ dimensiona.l  choice of tsx  rate.  The political  equilibrium  concept
is assumed  to be majority  rule in a standard tw!-party  competition over the single issue d.
An individual  with  initial  wealth g-iadividual  g, for short-thus  solves  the following problem:
max {Iog  (y -  s) + plog [(1  -  A)  rRs  + r]]  ,
given y, 0 and r.  The solution for savings,  s, is:r
Br -  1+8" (1  -r)R(1  +B)'
Consumption i:r the two periods is given by
and
cr  :  Y-s
: #[,.n-om],
c2 :  (t-9)Rs+r
-  F  ,,-^oL,-  t  I -  7+p  L''(1  -r)  ftl'
Given d and r,  let s (y) denote savings  of someone  with  income gr. Then, aggregate  tax revetrue  is 0 times
lNote we impose  no nonnegativity constraid  on 3,-,agregate period-two  income  from savings,  and the per capita transfer  in equilibrium  satisfies
0R  [" s  (y)  p(dy)
M
where pc  is the distribution  of agents  accordi::g  to initial  wealth le!€ls, and 1vf  = 
"[y l, (du) is ttre total measure
of agents-  Substituting  in s  (g) gives
el.lll  r  I '  : 
nr lyl:+Bu-  l4\R(1+qJP\qY)
0Rp  (7  _ e) r:  (1  -o)(t+il+ov'
:  oR#s-F=*^
where  !  =,[yvr(dg)  /M  \s average  initial wealth. Then
(2.1)
Remembering  the  expressions  for  individuals'  consmption,  a little  algebra  re'r'eals that  individual  g's
conflrmption  in  the  two  periods  is giveu  by
",  =  hl,-'o*F]
t  l(r+P)v+00@-a)1 =  r+Bl-r-a-eo  l
n lt+oti+ar(r-;)l :  r+ol-1+e--+T-Ea-)
and
. : #(r-d)n[,-O+u]
: &(1  _  d)  n,  l,'. 
t  r+;':Fr-  "51- ,Then, individual g's 'indirect' utility  function-maximized  utility  as  a function of y  fy,  d and other para.rreters
has the form
w10:v/!)=  consrant  +  (1  +f)lo- /tr 
+  sl  ; +ap  (r - f)\  -, - 
f---t7;-----  )+ 
Etoet-e)  e'2)
The constant involves B and -R,  of course,  as well as a term of the form (1 + 0) log (9-).
Consider  the  problen  of maximizing  .@;ulil  with respect  to 0,0 € i0,1]. Theconstraintg<1will
not be binding, of course,  asw(L;yl!):  -oo when d:1.  The constraint,  > 0 will be binding,  however,
for individuals  wrfn a  /g  )  1. Ii's  straightforward  to show lhal  Ior g/!  )  i-that  is, foi- indir.iduals -hose
initial  wealth is greater than average-tl  (|iy  lg) ls decreasing  il  d over the interral  [0, f]  a,nd  is maximized
atd:0-
For the relatively  poor-those  iudividuals  wrtin g/A  <  1---fle  can show that  u(0;g/!)  is concave  and
attains a unique maximum at a d € (0, 1) which depends  on g/g-. As one would expect, the ma)rimizitg lalue
of d rises as g/g  fals:  poorer individuals prefer higher taxes and traasfers.
For ind.ividuals wi  th U  li  < l,gi\€u  our specification of preferences,  one carl say even more. Tedious alge-
bra shows  that  the first-order couditiou for an interior maximum of (2.2) reduces  to the following quadratic
eouation  in 0:
p2  (7  - fi)  e2  - (1  +  B)  11  + 2p  (r - o)l  d  + (1  + B)'z  (1  - O)  : 0,
where f,l =  $.  The appropriate solution to this quadratic equation is
.@=#'#{#;i)  -'#6ffiW
For 0 < O <  1, 0. (O) is strictly betv/een  zero  and one, ald increases  as f) falls. Figure 1 plots 0* agairxt walues
of u/i  :f)  <  1 for warious  values of the preference para.meter  B.  Although  the tsx  rate is monotonically
decreasiag  in O, it  is not monotonic in B.
Let 0 (u  /r)  denote the preferred tsx rate of an individual  with  initia.I wealth relative to the arerage given- bV A/r.  The above consideratiors imply that
etulr):{ 
,.U,  :,,,tr.:
Since each individual  g's preferences  over d are single peaked, the median voter theorem applies. Let gm
denote  the median  of the distribution of ini-tiat  wealth-  i..  e., a^  is defired by  Il^  p Ug) :  l.  It y^  > u,
then the majority-rule  eqfibrium  tar  rate is zero. ff y^  < a, the equilibrium tax rate is gir.,en  by 0- (g^/f).
Since the equilibrium  ta>c  rate depends oriy  on g^f!,  any change in  the distribution  of initial  wealth
which chaaged both  the median and mean in  the same proportion  would leave the equilibrium  tax  rate
ruafiected.  On the other hand, if we take, as seems  natural,  a decrease  in y^ fa  to ir;'dicate  a gteater level
of wealth inequality, then greater itequality  will  be associated with  higher rates of taxation.  One can also
compa.re  the equilibrium  tax rate to the tax rate, call it  d", which would naximize  the per capita transfer r-
As one  can tell from the expression  above  for r in terms  of0, equation  (2.1),  the model indeed  has  a'Laffer
curve', aud a unique revmue-maximizing tax rate.  In  political  eqfibriumJ  though, if  the median voter's
level of income is such that
u^ , vt+V -t
n ----v-
then  the  majority-ru.le  tsx  rate  o(ceeds 0?-that  is,  the  economy  ends up  on  the  'wrong'  side of  the  Laffer
curye.
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